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Greater China: The Next 
Economic Superpowerl 
Murray Weidenbaum 
Preoccupied with political challenges in 
Europe and the Middle East and with economic 
competition from I apan, most Americans are 
ignoring a powerful longer-term trend in 
Southeast Asia: the rise of the greater China 
economy. Paced by a rapid rate of investment 
and given the abundance of trained human cap-
ital, the Asian rim has become the fastest 
growing part of the world, averaging over five 
percent a year in ~eal eeonomic growth. That 
trend is generally expected to continue at least 
for the rest of this decade and perhaps well into 
the twenty-first century .1 
Without underestimating the strategic role of 
the I apanese economy in the Asian rim, there is 
another way of looking at economic develop-
ments in this key region. Over the years, 
scholars in the United States have referred to 
the Chinas as a multiple - two Chinas, three 
Chinas, and more. They have in mind the fact 
that several of the major economies of this re-
gion have a predominantly Chinese population 
and an unusual degree of interaction is evident: 
In addition to mainland China, the overall 
Chinese economy includes such other rapidly 
growing areas as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, 
and Singapore. This category also includes 
other key locations where business executives, 
traders, and financiers of Chinese background 
make important economic contributions. Ac-
cording to some estimates, Chinese companies 
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in Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Phil-
ippines make up about 70 percent of the private 
sector in those countries. 2 
The "Chinese-based economy" has resisted 
the global recession which in recent years has 
plagued virtually every advanced industrial na-
tion. This informal economy is currently the 
world leader in terms of economic growth, in-
dustrial expansion, and exports. It contains an 
array of potential consumers that far exceeds 
the markets in Europe or the Western Hemi-
sphere. 
Within the Asian rim, this dynamic pattern 
contrasts with the recent slowdown in the pace 
of Japanese economic and financial activity. 
Japan Is foreign direct investment flows reached 
a peak of $67 billion in 1989 and have been de-
clining since. The 1991 total came to a modest 
$41 billion, lower than the 1988 rate. Japanese 
direct investment in Asia declined simultane-
ously, from a peak of a little over $8 billion in 
1989 to less than $6 billion in 1991. 
Moreover, Japanese banks have tended to re-
duce their participation in the international 
banking market. The $53 billion reduction in 
their foreign banking assets in the second 
quarter of 1992 was the largest recorded to 
date.3 Of course, in absolute terms, Japan 
continues to be the dominant economy in Asia 
and will continue to hold that position for many 
years. 
The Nature of the Chinese-Based 
Economy 
Despite the current Japanese dominance of 
the region, the Chinese-based economy of Asia 
is rapidly emerging as a new epicenter for in-
dustry, commerce, and finance. This strategic 
area contains substantial amounts of technology 
and ~anufacturing capability (Taiwan), out-
s~dtng entrepreneurial, marketing, and ser-
vices acumen (Hong Kong), a fine communica-
tions network (Singapore), a tremendous pool 
of fmancial capital (all three), and very large 
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endowments of land, resources, and labor 
(mainland China). A talking doll, to take a 
modest example, may be designed in Hong 
Kong, contain a computer chip made in Tai-
wan, and be assembled in China. 
Transnational networks are the backbone 
of the East Asian economy. 
The informal Chinese economy differs from 
the more official economies which usually are 
dominated by large multinational firms. Of the 
world 1 s 500 leading industrial companies in the 
world in 1991, only one, Chinese Petroleum, 
was part of the greater China economy (it is 
Taiwanese, and is in 166th place). In compari-
son, 13 Korean companies make the list; the 
largest, Samsung, is the 18th largest industrial 
firm listed in the Fortune tabulation. 
The Chinese-based economy consists in 
large measure of midsize family-run firms, 
rather than the huge corporations characteristic 
of Japan, Western Europe, and the United 
States. Transnational networks seem to be the 
natural accompaniment of the Chinese trading 
tradition. These channels for the movement of 
information, finance, goods, and capital help to 
explain the relative flexibility and efficiency of 
the numerous ongoing informal agreements and 
transactions that bind together the various parts 
of the Chinese-based trading area. 
From Guangzhou to Singapore, from Kuala 
Lumpur to Manila, this influential network -
often based on extensions of the traditional 
clans - has been described as the backbone of 
the East Asian economy. A substantial amount 
of cross-investment and trade takes place, often 
on a family basis. Frequently, these business 
ties involve "overseas" Chinese who are deal-
ing with people in the province of China from 
which they or their ancestors migrated 
(tongbao or compatriots).4 
To be sure, government is often heavily in-
volved in the ownership if not the operation of 
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many specific ~nterprises. In Taiwan, the 
KMT (the Nationalist Party or Kuomintang) is 
the largest property owner, with widespread 
business interests. In mainland China, in addi-
tion to numerous private ventures (often in 
collaboration with foreign investors), govern-
ment owns a great variety of enterprises. 
These range from the central government's gi-
ant steel mills to local government factories. 
The trading companies, which engage in a vari-
ety of commercial, banking, and manufacturing 
activities, are owned by governmental units, 
ranging from the army to a local county. s 
1hree-.fifths of all foreign investment 
in China has been made by Hong Kong's 
Chinese entrepreneurs. 
The close connection between public and 
private sectors and the greater China economy 
is illustrated by the operations of the Shanghai 
Far East Container Company. This joint ven-
ture between Shanghai, Hong Kong, and 
Taiwan involves enterprises in all three areas to 
produce steel containers in Shanghai. An even 
greater extension of capitalism occurred in June 
1992, when the city of Wuhan allowed 
Hongtex Development Company, a Hong Kong 
firm, to buy a 51 percent share of Wuhan No. 
2 Printing and Dyeing Company. This transac-
tion marked the first time a "foreign" company 
was allowed to acquire a majority stake in a 
state-owned enterprise in China, albeit an ailing 
one. . 
In contrast, the city of Qiaotori, in Zhejiang 
province, has no state-owned enterprises. This 
metropolitan area has recently become the but-
ton-making capital of China. Seven Hong 
Kong and Taiwan companies have set up joint 
ventures to produce buttons for China's grow-
ing textile industry. 6 
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The Close Connections 
Several economic indicators, ranging from 
modest to basic, illustrate the close connection 
among the "Chinas." Eight years ago, the. spe-
cial economic zone of Xiamen in mainland 
China booked 10 telephone calls a month to 
Taiwan. Currently, such calls are averaging 
60,000 a month and the number continues to 
rise. In 1987, fewer than 7,000 Taiwanese 
visited the mainland. The current rate is ap-
proximately 1 million a year. Bilateral trade, 
which can legally be conducted only through 
third countries, was about $1.5 billion in 1987. 
The current figure is about $6 billion, a four-
fold increase. In addition, about 4,000 Taiwan 
enterprises have set up factories in China, 
mainly in the south. In the aggregate, more 
than 5,000 Taiwanese companies have invested 
approximately $5 billion in the China main-
land.? 
The current state of interdependence be-
tween mainland China and Hong Kong is even 
more striking. Each is the other's largest 
trading partner and largest source of external 
investment. Three-fifths of all foreign invest-
ment in China has been made by Hong Kong's 
Chinese entrepreneurs. 8 
A recent example of this development is the 
$60 million project on the part of Hong Kong-
based Tian An China Group to construct a 
large commercial and office building in the 
heart of Changzhou, an industrial city in 
Jiangsu province. Similar is the teaming up of 
Hong · Kong's K wah International Holdings 
with a variety of partners in China to develop a 
commercial office tower in Shanghai. The 
partners include the Hwang Pu District 
Resettlement unit, the People's Bank of China, 
the Shanghai Land Development Company, and 
the Hwang Pu district government. 9 
The People's Republic of China has report-
edly invested approximately $11 billion in 
Hong Kong trade, real estate, transport, and fi-
nancial enterprises. One result is that the Bank 
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of China is now the second biggest bank in the 
colony, as measured by volume of deposits. In 
the other direction, 80 percent of Hong Kong's 
manufacturing companies have branches in 
China, employing more than three million 
workers. Apparently there were far more peo-
ple working in China for businesses owned by 
Hong Kong or on orders received from them 
than the entire manufacturing work force of 
Hong Kong itself (in a reported ratio of 4 to 
1).10 
Approximately 50,000 managers and profes-
sionals commute daily from Hong Kong to the 
nearby Guangdong province. About 60 percent 
of China's exports go through Hong Kong. 
These reexports, in turn, account for the 
greater part of Hong Kong's exports. The data 
support the conclusion of William Purves, 
chairman of the Hong Kong Bank Group, that 
"Investment and expertise channeled from 
Hong Kong have turned southern China into 
one of the industrial powerhouses of Asia." 11 
In fact, what some observers call the greater 
"Hong Kong enclave" is likely soon to enjoy a 
gross domestic product as large as that of 
France. 
Macao, a neighbor of Hong Kong, is also 
undergoing a period of rapid growth. Al-
though under nominal Portuguese sovereignty 
until 1999, this island economy is developing 
its ties with the rest of the greater China 
.economy. The new airport being built on the 
island has the strong support of mainland China 
(which differs from the case of the contro-
versial new airport being planned for Hong 
Kong). China's Chung Luen consortium holds 
an 8.67 percent interest in the company which 
is building and is also scheduled to operate the 
facility .12 
At the more macroeconomic level, some 
private analysts, adding up the foreign ex-
change reserves of the various Chinas, come to 
a present total of $200 billion. That amount is 
far in excess of the foreign exchange holdings 
of any other economic power worldwide. It 
surely is an impressive financial aggregation 
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with considerable potential for influencing the 
direction of future economic developments. 
Indeed, in 1991 Taiwan alone was the 
largest single foreign investor in Malaysia and 
also in Vietnam. Cumulative foreign direct in-
vestment from the newly industrialized econo-
mies of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore is 
beginning to surpass that of both Japan and the 
United States in Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Thailand. Not too surprising, the rapidly de-
veloping Asian rim countries are turning to 
new suppliers within their own region for their 
imports. These newly developing countries 
now buy 33 percent of their imports from other 
nations within the region compared to less than 
24 percent as recently as 1985.13 
1he economy of mainland China may exceed 
that of Japan by the year 2000, 
if not sooner. 
The trend toward the internationalization of 
production within the greater Chinese area is 
not generally viewed, however, as motivated 
by the desire to integrate trade. Rather, the 
end objective often is to export final products 
to third countries in Western Europe and North 
America. Thus, trade data for Southeast Asia 
must be interpreted with this tendency in mind . 
A Look to the Future 
Former World Bank president Robert 
McNamara has provided an upbeat long-term 
appraisal of the economic prospects of main-
land China. He states that, if China achieves 
its economic goals for the year 2000 and then 
moves forward at satisfactory but not spectac-
ular growth rates, that nation's per capita in-
come in 2050 may be roughly equal to that of 
the United Kingdom in 1965. The total size of 
its economy would approximate that of the 
United States or Western Europe.14 One U.S. 
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economist estimates that the economy of main-
land China alone may exceed that of I apan by 
the year 2000, if not sooner.lS 
When we add to these forecasts the other 
parts of the greater China economy, the eco-
nomic implications of the extension of current 
trends into the twenty-first century becomes 
awe-inspiring. This study leaves the subject of 
potential political unification to others. We 
must take note, of course, of the severe strains 
in mainland China which are arising as an eco-
nomically backward, communist-led nation at-
tempts to move to a capitalist regime. Almost 
by definition, adoption of a private enterprise 
system, however halting and incomplete, means 
the broadening of the society's power base and 
considerable decentralization of decisionmak-
ing. The existing power structure is not likely 
to respond to these changes passively. 
Moreover, recent purchases of advanced 
military aircraft by Taiwan have raised levels 
of tension in the area. However, this study 
focuses on the economic aspects of the develop-
ments of the Greater China economy. The im-
plicit assumption here is that the pervasive at-
tractions of rapid economic development will, 
at least in the long run, overcome political 
animosities. The tragic events in Lebanon, 
however, show the limitations of this assump-
tion. In that case, the great economic potential 
of the country was virtually destroyed by un-
reconcilable political antagonism. 
Surely the more complete industrialization 
of Southeast Asia is a prospect that Western 
analysts have not fully examined. Neverthe-
less, a few already are referring to a 
forthcoming 11 Chinese Century. 11 The 11 Chinese 
Productivity Triangle II is another, and more 
modest, description that is in use. With the 
opening of China and capital flows to it, 
Greater China is rapidly becoming one of the 
world's most vibrant economies. It is no exag-
geration to state that Greater China is a poten-
tial economic superpower. 
A historical parallel comes to mind: the key 




League. For many centuries during the late 
middle ages, the League tied together first the 
merchants and then many of the cities of north-
em Germany and the Baltic area. Historians 
stress the fact that the Hanse cities did not set 
up a joint or unified government. Rather, the 
business and government leaders cooperated on 
matters of mutual economic and financial inter-
est. A shifting array of participants can be 
identified over the centuries. Some of the large 
German cities in the qualifying area did not 
participate at all, and many entered into the co-
operative arrangements for only limited periods 
oftime.16 . 
Greater China is rapidly becoming one of 
the world's most vibrant economies. 
Unlike the European Community or the 
North American Free Trade Agreement, the 
Hanseatic League was not a compact among 
sovereign powers, nor did it constitute a super-
government. Individual members continued to 
owe their traditional allegiance to the specific 
political power that controlled the part of the 
region in which they resided. Technically, the 
League was an amorphous organization, lack-
ing legal status and possessing neither finances 
of its own nor an independent army or navy. 
Nevertheless, the Hanse merchants cooper-
ated in many important ways, providing mutual 
support in times of danger. They constituted 
an identifiable economic grouping which com-
peted with businesses in Holland, Italy, and on 
different occasions, many of the nations facing 
the Baltic Sea. Despite the obvious limitations 
of a nongovernmental organization spread over 
considerable distances - Bergen in Norway 
was an important Hanse location as was 
Novgorod in Russia - for almost five cen-
turies the Hanseatic League was an economic 
power to be reckoned with. 
No analyst can forecast with any degree of 
assurance the future nature of economic rela-
9 
tionships in Eastern Asia. Will a modem ver-
sion of the Hanseatic League be created? Will 
a counterpart to the European Community 
arise? Will the more modest arrangements be-
ing developed in North America be the prece-
dent that will be followed? Or will the present 
informal relationships be relied· on in view of 
their substantial success? 
Whatever the answer, trends rarely move in 
a straight line for an extended period of time. 
In the· recent past, setbacks have occurred in 
the economic and political development of 
Southeast Asia and future detours are likely. 
Some experts offer a more pessimistic assess-
ment than presented in this report. Ross Terrill 
of the East Asian Research Center of Harvard 
University believes that China can never truly 
prosper while the Communist Party retains its 
monopoly of power. Any gains resulting from 
piecemeal economic reforms, in this view, will 
merely benefit the· Communists by pacifying the 
citizenry. Other visitors to China report that 
their dominant impression of the new economic 
wnes, such as Guangdong, is one of official 
favoritism, inside deals, and outright bribery. 
As economic journalist Dan Cordtz recently 
wrote after an extensive visit, China remains a 
poor, developing nation by Western standards: 
"At best, it is a bicycle society moving up to 
motor scooters." 17 
Great uncertainty surely attaches to the fu-
ture of the Chinese economy. The People's 
Republic is making it clear that it wants to par-
ticipate actively in determining the future di-
rection of the economy of Hong Kong. But 
there is little clarity as to the nature of that 
participation and the desired direction of 
change. Likewise, the relations between Pe-
king and Taipei at best can be described as 
ambiguous. The political ties between China 
and th~ rest of the Chinese trading area, no-
tably Stngapore, range from loose to nonexis-
tent. The notion of political integration does 
not now appear as a realistic short -term 
prospect. However, what does seem likely is 
.tO 
~ntinuing informal integration, perhaps lead-
mg to a de facto Chinese Common Market. 
Nevertheless, forces of economic and busi-
ness development seem likely to dominate es-pecially~ the_long run. As in Eastern Eu;ope, 
commumsm did not fall primarily because the 
people rejected the ideology of Marx (if they 
ever understood it). Rather, they saw the 
v~tly greater. benefi~ of democracy and 
pnvate enterpnse. Whichever specific course 
is followed in Southeast Asia, it is reasonable 
to expect some type of response to the 
economic unification that is now occurring in 
the two other major competitive areas, Western 
Europe and North America. 
In Eastern Europe, communism did not 
fall because the people rejected 
the ideology of Marx. 
Conclusion 
~e ris~ of the greater China economy must 
be viewed m the context of the increasing glob-
alization of economic enterprise. Despite the 
many efforts of government . to restrain or at 
least redirect trade and investment, individual 
businesses are succeeding in overcoming these 
obstacles to private decisionmaking. The mo-
bili~ of ente~rises- of their people, capital, 
and information - is reducing the power of 
government. Public sector decisionmakers in-
creasingly are being forced to understand that 
ther. no~ have to become internationally com-
petitive m the economic policies they devise. 
In th~s era of computers, telephones, and fax 
machmes, enterprises are extremely mobile.18 
The most striking examples of that mobility are 
the recent experiences of Chinese entrepre-
neurs. 
_Even in the face of official hostility, many 
Taiwanese firms and a great number of 
Taiwanese individuals are succeeding in estab-
11 
lishing their business presence in China. As 
we have seen in the case of Hong Kong and the 
mainland, the mutual economic interpenetration 
is even more striking. The formal power of 
government is not to be discounted - and its 
destructive ability has been vividly demon-
strated in innumerable wars. Nevertheless, the 
continuing desire of people to respond to the 
power of economic incentives and technological 
advance surely seems pervasive. 
Looking ahead to the twenty-first century, 
the Chinese economic and trading area might 
well reach across the Pacific (some early mani-
festations are already evident in the Silicon 
Valley in California). Such a development 
would form a major part of the economic and 
Pacific equivalent of NATO, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. But,· unlike NATO and 
like the Hanseatic League of old, that area 
would not be dominated by a single govern-
ment unit or depend on a military or political 
pact. On the contrary, it would be both con-
tributor to and beneficiary of the world's 
largest and most open commercial region. 
Barring a major political setback in the inter-
vening period, the Chinese economic area has 
the potential of providing a principal engine of 
world growth in the early twenty-first century. 
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